Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda

Several of my friends have told me that if I want to begin to understand the role of Special Forces and Special Operations, I must read "Not A Good Day To Die." I finished reading this book several weeks ago, and am able now to take the time to share with readers of The White Rhino Report some of my thoughts. The subtitle of this book is "The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda." Sean Naylor, winner of the prestigious Edgar A. Poe Award, does a masterful job of bringing the reader into the chaos that enveloped the soldiers fighting in Afghanistan's Shahikot Valley.The primary take-way for me, as I reflected on what happened during Operation Anaconda in 2002, was that the pattern seemed all too familiar - a pattern of systemic miscommunication and flawed decisions made far from the battle field. Many of these decisions and orders placed in grave jeopardy the lives of those fighting on the ground and in the air. Throughout my reading of Naylor's descriptions and analysis, I was reminded of the landmark study by my friend, Dr. Scott Snook of the Harvard business School faculty. Dr. Snook, a decorated combat veteran and expert in organizational behavior, wrote the book, Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq, an analysis of an incident that occurred at the end of the first Gulf War. Dr. Snook not only highlights the systemic failures that led to the needless shootdown of two Black Hawks, but points out that similar dysfunction can be identified in any organization.Naylor summarizes concisely the chaos that developed in the Shahikot Valley:"The small, enclosed battlefield meant the calls for fire often outnumbered the number of airplanes that could safely be flying bombing runs over the valley simultaneously; the icy relationship between Mikolashek and Mosley, who should have been working hand in glove, trickled down to their staffs; the Mountain staff's failure to anticipate the likelihood of ferocious resistance on the enemy's part meant they had given only cursory attention to close air support issues; and the Combined Air Operations Center staff had grown used to controlling air strikes from their base in Saudi Arabia, rather than yielding authority to the ground commander, as called for in joint doctrine. As ever in combat, it was left to captains and sergeants to bear the consequences of mistakes made by generals." (Page 272)The author continues his observations and conclusions with these thoughts:"But the lack of clear guidance about who was in charge of the recce missions being launched from Gardez now began to reap disastrous results . . . This critical moment in Operation Anaconda was to be no exception. Just 1,000 meters away at the safe hose, helping to coordinate the preparations for Operation Payback (not scheduled to launch until 2:20 a.m.), was Peter Blaber, a man whose entire career had prepared him to make the kind of decision Hyder now faced, a decision upon which would hang the fates not just of Hyder's men, but of others as well. Blaber had spent weeks immersing himself in the tactical situations that confronted recce teams in the Shahikot. He was also still - officially - the officer commanding the reconnaissance effort in the valley. But Hyder chose to ignore him and instead seek guidance from the Blue TOC, which was almost 100 miles away and staffed with Navy personnel who had never been anywhere near the Shahikot." (Pages 308-9)I closed the book after reading the last pages and found myself balancing competing emotions. On the one hand, I was proud of the men who had fought bravely in carrying out their assignments as part of the complex Operation anaconda. On the other hand, I was angry at the seemingly chronic failure of senior leadership to exercise proper command and control. Perhaps this kind of confusion, chaos and mismanagement is an unavoidable consequence of the "fog of war," but it seems that our men and women who put their lives on the line deserve better support.The book is a tribute to our fighting forces, as well as a cautionary tale. I recommend it to anyone who wants to understand the complexities of fighting battles under extreme duress and in the most inhospitable of landscapes - both topographical and bureaucratic!Al

One of my best friends was written about in this book. This mission [Operation Anaconda] happened prior to us being deployed together on a different mission/operation. I know that his experience during Operation Anaconda affected him in ways I’ll never know. I read this book hoping to gain a better understanding of him and what he’s been through.

Sean Naylor nails it with this fascinating and thoroughly engrossing account of one of the most ferocious fights of the Global War on Terrorism to date. The first set piece battle of the 21st century for the U.S. military, Operation Anaconda endeavors to demonstrate how conventional forces and special operations forces can be effectively integrated.The unforgiving Shahikot Mountains of northeastern Afghanistan are the setting for this superb chronicle of modern combat. In addition to revealing some of the struggles inherent in integrating conventional and special operations forces, Anaconda exposes lingering interoperability problems in combining Navy, Army, and Air Force elements in joint operations.When the units involved are hit by a perfect storm of challenges - everything from a convoluted, unwieldy command and control structure to poor intelligence to an astonishingly well-equipped and well-trained Al Qaeda main force - the operation's success appears in jeopardy. While von Clauswitz's "friction of battle" (and perhaps Murphy's Law) clearly had a place at the table in this one, Naylor fairly points out that there was at times an obvious failure of leadership.In a testament to the courage and adaptability of both special operators and light infantrymen, however, U.S. and allied forces gradually reduce Al Qaeda's combat effectiveness mostly through "fires" - precision air strikes, lethal attack helicopters, and well-placed mortar fire. If not for the special operators on the ground, particularly 1st SFOD-D (Delta Force) and Australian SAS reconnaissance elements operating far forward in observation posts and directing many of those air strikes, U.S. casualties would have been far more numerous.Remarkable for the degree to which highly classified 'black' operations are illuminated, Not a Good Day to Die is without a doubt the most eminently readable of the many books to emerge from the War in Afghanistan to date.While I knew more than most about Operation Anaconda and the battle for the Shahikot Valley, the author's extraordinary effort to reveal what actually happened, especially on Takur Ghar Mountain where the most violent, close combat took place, and to reconcile the many conflicting media accounts of the battle was extremely helpful to me.Through extensive interviews and exhaustive research in spite of an apparent effort to restrict his access to after action reports and other documents, Naylor meticulously pieces together the events of the battle.Perhaps most surprising was the extent to which the author exposes the many flaws in planning; the violation of many of the military's revered principles of war; and, the degree to which senior leaders "half a world away" attempt to command essentially through videoconferencing and other satellite communications technologies. Not only are we witness to the flaws in the human element of waging war, but we gain an appreciation for the limits of our 'superior' technology.We discover once again that there is no substitute for the U.S. Army infantryman when it comes to seizing and holding ground.Interestingly, Naylor's depiction of the vaunted U.S. Navy SEALs, surprisingly including members of SEAL Team 6, suggests that their training for mountain warfare may be sorely lacking. In fact, it becomes clear that in an effort to get SEALs into the fight, the Task Force 11 commander (Task Force 11 was the 'black' operations command) may have overestimated the SEALs' capabilities and sent them in unprepared for what they would face.Despite Not a Good Day to Die's many merits, I found certain elements of the book not quite up to par. For instance, the editing is poor. Some information is actually repeated, and there are misstatements and typos. Beyond that, Naylor spends an excessive amount of time on the run up to the battle, and as a result the story bogs down a bit in the early chapters. Most readers could probably get by with considerably less detail around the planning stages of the operation.Nevertheless, this is a story that needed to be told, and Sean Naylor does a tremendous job telling it.I highly recommend this book for anyone who wants to know what actually happened in Operation Anaconda.Riveting!

Although the book content is good, and reasonably well written, the Kindle version is littered with errors. Illustrations are also poorly converted making their inclusion virtually useless. This made it very difficult to follow with any sort of geographical understanding

Excellent book, very in-depth. No light weight reading material, but differently worth the time and effort. Congratulations to the author for taking on such a massive and detailed subject.

It is amazing the American forces achieved anything in Afghanistan. The poor grunt on the ground as always left to pick up the pieces after those above create total disarray. If this book is at it happened they were very lucky to get away with so little loss of life.

There's a good book in here somewhere, but it's obscured by way too much detail, and way too many names of people, military units, and locations, especially in the early chapters.In addition, my kindle version was riddled with typographical errors, which made it that much harder to read.

I first heard of this engagement from Seymour Hersh in Chain of Command where it is characterised very differently. This is a detailed account of the preparation of a plan to end insurgent occupation of the Shahikot Valley and the separate actions of the various NATO forces engaged. It is genuinely fascinating though the very necessary complexity of the issues involved make for a difficult read. What is missing is perspective from the other side. The insurgents here are just targets, casualties and scatted bits of human flesh. The author's blindness to this is chilling. The text also ends rather abruptly. There's no final overview of the issues raised and lessons learned. I recommend to enthusiasts of battleground depictions.